I examine insurer entry in the states with health insurance marketplaces run through healthcare.gov. Because insurers offer plans with horizontally differentiated cost-sharing parameters, I use outcomes that measure "premium plus cost-sharing" parameters, a patient's premium plus cost-sharing as a function of their medical utilization. To address the potential endogeneity of insurer entry, I use an instrumental variables approach. In the first year of the marketplaces, I find that an additional insurer decreased premium plus cost-sharing parameters by 5 percent or more. In the second year of the marketplaces, two national insurers entered many of the marketplaces for the first time. Except for inpatient services, I find that a new insurer had no average effect on premium plus cost-sharing parameters. However, new insurer entry was more likely to lower premium plus cost-sharing parameters in counties with fewer incumbent insurers. In counties with three or more incumbent insurers, a new insurer actually increased cost-sharing parameters for emergency room services. The increases may be related to new insurers shifting bargaining power to be more in favor of emergency departments when negotiating costs of medical services.
I. Introduction
Since 2014, as a result of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), nonelderly adults in the United States can access online marketplaces to purchase private health insurance. In their first two years the marketplaces facilitated enrollment for 10 million individuals, about 85 percent of whom received financial assistance. Because federal subsidies are defined so that the government pays less when insurers offer plans with lower premiums, both consumers and taxpayers depend on insurer competition to minimize their respective costs. However, because insurers rely on bargaining power over medical providers to maintain low costs for medical services, it is not clear that additional insurers always benefit consumers and taxpayers. In this paper I provide new evidence on insurer competition in the marketplaces. In particular, I estimate the marginal effect of insurer Brett Lissenden (bcl8ag@virginia.edu), University of Virginia. I have no relevant or material financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper. All errors are my own.
entry on premiums and cost-sharing parameters in both the first and second years of the marketplaces.
Premium plus cost-sharing is the total cost of health care for insured consumers as a function of the cost of medical services that they use. It is the combination of their plan's premium and the amount of cost-sharing they are required to contribute toward their medical expenses according to the parameters defined by their plan. I study the 34 states with federally facilitated marketplaces, where insurers have considerable latitude to vary cost-sharing parameters even within plans that provide the same actuarial value of benefits. In this setting, insurers could compete by offering plans with similar cost-sharing parameters but lower premiums, or they could compete by offering plans with similar premiums but more specialized cost-sharing parameters. Since additional insurers could lower patient costs under either scenario, an important contribution of this research is to incorporate both premiums and cost-sharing parameters in the outcome variables.
Since data on plan choices and medical utilization for enrollees in the marketplaces have not been made available, I define outcome variables that measure "premium plus cost-sharing" parameters, realizations of offered premium plus cost-sharing for various hypothetical medical service costs. First, I choose service costs to represent medical services that patients might use, as motivated by the distribution of medical service costs in the 2012 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. Second, for each "silver" plan, I compute premium plus cost-sharing for the various service costs based on the plan's premium and cost-sharing parameters indicated by publicly available healthcare.gov data. Third, for each service cost, I summarize premium plus cost-sharing at the county level by taking either the minimum of premium plus cost-sharing across all plans in the county or the premium plus cost-sharing from the plan with the lowest premium.
1 I refer to the outcome array of premium plus cost-sharing for the various service costs as premium plus cost-sharing parameters.
In the first year of the marketplaces, premium plus cost-sharing parameters were lower in counties with more insurers. This is not necessarily a causal relationship, because more insurers might have participated in counties where their variable costs (e.g., expected claim reimbursements) were lower. In order to estimate a causal effect, I rely on an instrumental variables (IV) approach. The instruments measure variation in insurers' fixed costs of regulatory compliance from participating in different markets. Insurers make entry decisions at the county level, but regulatory compliance costs are paid at the state level. Insurers that decide to enter a state because of high expected profits in other counties are thus more likely to enter a marginal county in that state. Consequently, all else equal, average insurer participation should be greater in states with more and larger geographic markets. Using the number, average market size, and total market size of residual rating areas in the state as instruments for insurer participation in a county, I estimate that an additional insurer induced premium plus cost-sharing parameters to be around 5 percent lower. The decrease, between 10 and 15 percent depending on the service cost amount, was greatest for service costs associated with inpatient care. These estimates represent causal effects as long as the number and size of residual rating areas is uncorrelated with unobserved components of demand and insurer variable costs. The identification assumption is supported by falsification tests that show the instruments are not correlated with pre-ACA premiums, claims, or utilization.
In the second year of the marketplaces there was a large increase in insurer entry because of new entry by Assurant Health and UnitedHealth. Consistent with the crosssectional pattern from the first year of the marketplaces, premium plus cost-sharing parameters generally decreased the most in counties where the number of insurers increased the most. However, this relationship is again not necessarily causal because new insurers could have entered in counties where their variable costs decreased. To establish a causal link, I separately use two sets of instruments for changes in insurer entry between 2014 and 2015. The first set of instruments includes the same variables used as instruments in the 2014 analysis. The second set of instruments measures pre-ACA market shares for Assurant and United. Estimates with either set of instruments represent causal effects as long as the instruments are uncorrelated with changes in demand or insurer variable costs between 2014 and 2015. Falsification tests support the identification assumptions because none of the instruments are correlated with pre-ACA changes in premiums, claims, or utilization. The estimates are similar with either set of instruments and reveal several interesting conclusions. First, there is no statistically distinguishable evidence that insurer entry lowered premiums. However, entry did increase risk protection for inpatient services because premium plus inpatient cost-sharing parameters decreased by 10 to 20 percent because of each new insurer. Second, the marginal effect of each new insurer varied according to the number of incumbent insurers. I split the sample into two subsamples, one with counties where two or fewer insurers participated in 2014 and one with counties where three or more insurers participated in 2014. For all 36 of my outcome variables, the estimate for the effect of insurer entry is lower in the sample of counties with fewer incumbent insurers. Additionally, in the counties with three or more incumbent insurers, each new insurer increased premium plus emergency room cost-sharing parameters by 4 to 8 percent. I find suggestive evidence that this might have occurred because new entry decreased insurer bargaining power with emergency departments.
Of the early research on insurer competition in the marketplaces, Dafny, Gruber, and Ody (2015) use the most credible identification strategy to address the potential endogeneity of insurer competition and find that it lowered premiums in 2014. This paper builds on their work by expanding both the time period and the range of outcomes. My results show that both of these added dimensions are important. In particular, insurer entry influences cost-sharing parameters in addition to premiums, and the influence varies according to baseline insurer participation. My analysis of the second year of the marketplaces is most similar to work by Sheingold, Nguyen, and Chappel (2015) , but they do not address the potential endogeneity of new insurer entry and do not include outcomes that incorporate cost-sharing. To my knowledge, Taylor et al. (2015) provide the only prior work that examines the relationship between insurer participation and an outcome related to costsharing. However, they do not address the potential endogeneity of insurer participation, do not incorporate all cost-sharing parameters, and do not examine the second year of the marketplaces.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the relevant background for the marketplaces. Section III outlines literature related to the competing effects of health insurer competition on patient costs. Section IV summarizes the data, Section V develops the empirical strategy, and Section VI presents the results. Finally, Section VII concludes with a discussion of the implications of the results.
II. Background
In this section I provide background about the marketplaces and the different marketplace plans. I start by noting the horizontal differentiation among plans, particularly with respect to cost-sharing parameters. I then outline the key features of the marketplaces and discuss changes in insurer participation as the marketplaces have evolved.
Each marketplace plan has a certified vertical quality, measured by the actuarial value of its plan benefits. In particular, all plans must cover a certain percentage of expected medical expenses, within a 2 percent margin of error, for a standard population of potential enrollees. The following are the four main allowable vertical qualities of plans, called metal tiers, with their required actuarial values in parentheses: bronze (60 percent), silver (70 percent), gold (80 percent), and platinum (90 percent).
2 Insurers must offer at least one silver and at least one gold plan in every county in which they participate, and are allowed to offer plans in other metal tiers if they choose.
Because of horizontal differentiation, plans in the same metal tier are not identical. There are several sources of horizontal differentiation across plans, but in this paper I focus on differences in cost-sharing parameters. Together with the plan's premium, though the premium does not vary with the use of medical services, cost-sharing parameters define a multidimensional and nonlinear relationship between medical utilization and total patient cost. The main cost-sharing variables are the deductible, out-of-pocket maximum, and any copays and coinsurance rates. Copays and coinsurance rates can, and often do, vary by category of medical service and whether the deductible has been reached. In practice, silver plans define cost-sharing parameters that are very different from one another. As long as the expected amount of total reimbursements implied by the plan design meets the required actuarial value, any combination of cost-sharing parameters can be used. The only exception is that the out-of-pocket maximum is not allowed to exceed a certain threshold, $6,350 for a 2014 plan sold to an individual. To give a sense of the variation, some marketplace plans set a deductible of zero while others set the deductible equal to the highest possible out-of-pocket maximum.
Besides variation in cost-sharing parameters, the main source of differentiation across marketplace plans is likely provider networks.
3 Each plan's provider network must meet minimum ACA standards, but some plans have broader networks than others. Ericson and Starc (2015) find that consumers value health insurance plans with broader provider networks, but there is anecdotal evidence that many marketplace plans cut costs by setting narrow networks. 4 Since I measure premium plus cost-sharing parameters from the plans with the lowest premiums and most generous cost-sharing parameters, my estimates likely reflect patient costs for plans with relatively narrow provider networks.
Each marketplace is a website for a particular state that allows individuals and families a one-stop shop to view their health insurance options and ultimately purchase a health insurance plan. States have some ability to regulate their own marketplace, but the ACA mandates a minimum set of regulations for all states. There are 34 states that elected to have the federal government at least partially manage their marketplace in the first two years, and the regulations that apply to marketplaces in these states are similar.
5
To interpret the effect of insurer entry on premium plus cost-sharing parameters, it is important to remember that premiums and cost-sharing are paid jointly by consumers and the government. Roughly 85 percent of enrollees in the marketplaces are individuals and families that qualify for federal subsidies. There are two different kinds of subsidies. The first is a premium subsidy, which is available to consumers with income between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL). 6 The premium subsidy is based on a cap for the premium the consumer pays if they purchase the "benchmark" silver plan in their county, which is the one with the second-lowest premium. The lower a consumer's income, the lower their cap. Consumers can apply their subsidy to any marketplace plan.
The second subsidy is a cost-sharing subsidy, and is only available to consumers who purchase a silver plan and have income between 100 percent and 250 percent of the FPL. For silver plans, insurers define baseline cost-sharing parameters and alternative, more generous, cost-sharing parameters for people who qualify for cost-sharing subsidies. Like the premium subsidy, the increased generosity of the cost-sharing parameters is greater for consumers with lower incomes. For any medical services used during the year, the consumer pays only the cost-sharing defined by the parameters that they qualify for. Any additional cost-sharing defined by the plan's baseline cost-sharing parameters is paid by the government directly to the insurer. adjudication and financial solvency in health insurance plans, but these are at least somewhat regulated by the state and not likely to be salient to consumers. 4 See "Regulators Urge Broader Health Networks, " published online in the New York Times on November 8, 2015. 5 There are some regulatory differences across the 34 states. I address the major ones with a robustness exercise in Section VI.B. 6 The FPL was $11,490 for a single-family household in the 2014 benefit year. Individuals with income less than 100 percent of the FPL qualify for either Medicaid or a hardship exemption from the insurance mandate, depending on the state in which they live.
Insurer participation has fluctuated in the early years of the marketplaces. In my analysis of the second year of the marketplaces, I rely on changes in insurer entry between 2014 and 2015, particularly due to the new entry of Assurant and United.
Assurant and United are both national insurers that were major players in the pre-ACA individual market. United is also a major player in the much larger employer-sponsored health insurance market, while Assurant is not. Assurant and United both declined to enter any counties in the states with federally facilitated marketplaces in 2014. Besides Aetna (854 counties), Assurant (934 counties) and United (760 counties) both participated in more counties than any other insurer in 2015. However, both Assurant and United decreased their participation in the marketplaces after 2015. Assurant closed its plans to new entrants after just one year and planned to shut down by the end of 2016.
7 United has said it will exit most of the federally facilitated marketplaces in 2017. 8 Despite their exits after 2015, it does not appear that Assurant and United pursued different pricing strategies from other national insurers. United offered the plan with the lowest premium in 30 percent of the counties in which it participated, similar to Aetna and Humana. On the other hand, Assurant offered the plan with the lowest premium in less than 1 percent of the counties in which it participated. Similarly, though, Cigna did not offer the plan with the lowest premium in any of the counties in which it participated. There were also no noticeable differences in the cost-sharing parameters used by Assurant and United versus other national insurers. Thus, entry by Assurant and United appears representative of entry by other national insurers.
III. Competing Effects of Insurer Entry on Patient Costs
Even though additional insurer entry should lower markups, the excess of premiums over expected insurer costs, it does not necessarily benefit consumers and taxpayers. Insurers rely on bargaining power over medical providers to minimize service costs and, all else equal, insurers have less bargaining power when medical providers have more insurers to potentially negotiate with. Thus, as shown by Ho and Lee (2016) , Melnick, Shen, and Wu (2011), and Moriya, Vogt, and Gaynor (2010) , increased insurer competition increases service costs that patients and insurers owe to medical providers. Particularly for patients who owe coinsurance for their marginal medical services, higher service costs directly imply higher patient costs. It does not necessarily imply a shift of premiums or cost-sharing parameters, however, which is what my outcomes would measure. My premium plus costsharing parameters measure will only shift because of higher service costs if insurers pass through their share of the higher service costs to patients by shifting cost-sharing parameters or by increasing premiums.
In employer-sponsored health insurance, researchers have found that higher service costs are partially passed through to consumers via higher premiums (Town et al. 2006; Trish and Herring 2015) . However, researchers looking at both employer-sponsored health insurance (Dafny, Duggan, and Ramanarayanan 2012; Ho and Lee 2016) and the first year of the marketplaces (Dafny, Gruber, and Ody 2015) agree that the net effect of an additional insurer is to lower health insurance premiums. Still, there are those that support limiting insurer competition in order to make health insurance more affordable. For example, most state Medicaid agencies contract with only a small number of managed care organizations to serve their Medicaid patients. The marketplace for California, Covered California, also selectively contracts with insurers. Within Covered California, Scheffler et al. (2016) found that premium growth from 2014 to 2015 was positively correlated with increases in insurer participation.
IV. Data and Descriptive Analysis
My empirical analysis relies on data from healthcare.gov for the first two years of the marketplaces. For each year of the marketplaces, the publicly available data from healthcare.gov contain information about issuing insurer, service area, premiums, and cost-sharing parameters for all plans in the states with federally facilitated marketplaces.
Each plan has been approved by the federal government and is defined by its issuer, premiums, benefit and cost-sharing parameters, provider network, and drug formulary. The same plan is often available in multiple counties and sometimes even in multiple states. The same issuer often offers multiple plans, even within the same metal tier. There are 34 states included in the data, encompassing 395 rating areas and 2,512 counties. Since my empirical strategy relies on variation from residual rating areas in a state, I exclude data from three states that have only one rating area. The excluded states are Delaware, New Hampshire, and New Jersey. The final data set covers 2,478 counties in 392 rating areas in 31 states.
I make three notable decisions with respect to measuring premiums and cost-sharing parameters with the healthcare.gov data. First, I follow the previous literature and focus only on silver plans.
10 Silver plans are convenient to study because offering at least one silver plan is mandatory for all participating insurers and silver is the only metal tier for which consumers can obtain subsidized cost-sharing. Likely for those reasons, silver plans 9 I downloaded the data from https://www.healthcare.gov/health-and-dental-plan-datasets-for-resear chers-and-issuers/ on December 2, 2014. The 2015 data have since been updated to exclude plans issued by Assurant, because it stopped enrolling new members as of June 15, 2015. The participation of Assurant in the 2015 marketplaces is critical for my empirical analysis, so I am happy to share my version of the data upon request. 10 I also only focus on the standard (i.e., 70 percent actuarial value) cost-sharing parameters. For consumers between 100 and 250 percent of the FPL, this represents the total cost-sharing that is split between the consumer and the government.
are also the most commonly selected plans.
11 Second, I measure premiums for a 27-yearold nonsmoker who purchases coverage only for himself or herself. Dafny, Gruber, and Ody (2015) and Burke, Misra, and Sheingold (2014) examine premiums for the same class of consumers. Plan premiums for all classes of consumers exhibit similar patterns since ACA regulations impose a scale of allowable differentiation in premiums based on age, family size, and smoking status. Third, I use counties as the unit of observation rather than rating areas. While Dafny, Gruber, and Ody (2015) and Burke, Misra, and Sheingold (2014) define rating areas as markets, Dickstein et al. (2015) and Sheingold, Nguyen, and Chappel (2015) use counties. The fundamental issue is that insurer entry and plan menus can vary at the county level, but premiums for the same plan can only vary across rating areas. Since nearly half of the multicounty rating areas in my data exhibit variation in insurer participation across counties, and this often leads to substantial differences when measuring the offered premium plus cost-sharing parameters, I define counties as markets but cluster standard errors by rating area.
A. I N S U R E R S
Since issuers defined in the healthcare.gov data sometimes share the same parent company, I use supplementary information on company ownership from SNL Financial in order to aggregate issuers into unique insurers. For example, Coventry has been owned by Aetna since April 2013 but is denoted as a separate issuer from Aetna in the healthcare.gov data. Another example is Florida Blue, Florida Blue HMO, and Florida Health Care Plans, which are all separately denoted companies in the healthcare.gov data that are owned by the same parent, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida. In the first year of the marketplaces, there are 90 unique insurers serving the 31 states in my data. The left panel of Figure 1 illustrates the variation in insurer entry across the 2,478 counties. Most counties had between one and three insurers, but some had as many as eight.
There was a large increase in insurer participation in the second year of the marketplaces; 1,422 of the 2,478 counties experienced an increase in insurer entry and only 55 counties experienced a decrease. The right panel of Figure 1 illustrates variation in the change in insurer participation from 2014 to 2015. Many counties experienced one or two new insurers because of Assurant and United, which together accounted for nearly 80 percent of the total change in insurer participation.
B. C O U N T Y C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S
The challenge in identifying a causal effect of insurer entry on premium plus cost-sharing parameters is that unobserved characteristics about the market, related to demand or insurer variable costs, could affect both entry and pricing. Since I use cross-sectional variation to examine the first year of the marketplaces, it is important to control for county characteristics related to demand and insurer variable costs. I use several data sources to construct variables that are motivated by previous literature and related to the cost of health care, demand for health care, characteristics of potential consumers, and negotiation of medical service costs. The variable for market size is particularly important for my empirical strategy because I also use it to characterize residual rating areas. Since most marketplace enrollees qualify for federal subsidies, I define market size as the number of individuals in the county projected to be eligible for federal subsidies. I calculate this variable in two steps. First, I use the 2012 American Community Survey to approximate the percentage of individuals within each county who are eligible for federal subsidies. 12 I assume someone is eligible for a federal subsidy if they are (1) a US citizen, (2) younger than 65 and without Medicare coverage, (3) not insured through an employer, and (4) between 100 percent and 400 percent of the federal poverty level. Second, I multiply the percentage of subsidy-eligible by the projected county population for 2013, taken from the Census QuickFacts.
For county characteristics besides market size, the Online Data Appendix (see http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/suppl/10.1162/ajhe_a_00085) provides motivation for their inclusion and contains details on their construction and definition. All of the county characteristic variables are summarized in Online Appendix Table A1 . Most of them are measured at the county level except the average hospital price variable, which is constructed to replicate the hospital price variable used by Dafny, Gruber, and Ody (2015) and measured at the rating area level. 13 The summary statistics indicate a lot of variation in market size, particularly because some counties are very large. The average county has about 65,000 individuals eligible for federal subsidies while the median county has less than 4,000.
C. O U T C O M E VA R I A B L E S
I define 36 outcome variables in order to summarize premium plus cost-sharing parameters for the available silver plans in a county. The outcome variables cover a range of 18 different service costs. For example, there is an outcome variable for premium plus cost-sharing if no medical services are used during the year. In this case, the premium plus cost-sharing, for a patient enrolled in a particular silver plan, is the plan's premium. There is also an outcome variable for premium plus cost-sharing if unlimited in-network medical services are used, in which case premium plus cost-sharing is the plan's premium plus out-of-pocket maximum.
14 The other 16 service costs cover intermediate levels of services a patient might incur. They cover four different service costs each for four different categories of in-network services: primary care, specialist care, emergency room care, and inpatient care. The four service costs within each category represent the distribution of service costs observed in the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey for the nonelderly population in 2012. For more details on the outcome variables, see the Online Data Appendix.
Given a particular service cost, because plans have different premiums and costsharing parameters, a patient's premium plus cost-sharing will vary depending on which plan he or she chose. I summarize premium plus cost-sharing parameters across silver plans in the county in two ways. First, for a given service cost, I take the lowest premium plus cost-sharing among all silver plans in the county. Second, I measure the premium plus cost-sharing parameters from the silver plan in the county with the lowest premium.
Online Appendix Table A2 summarizes the lowest-possible premium plus costsharing (left panel) and premium plus cost-sharing in the plan with the lowest premium (right panel) for the various service costs in each of the first two years of the marketplaces. There are a few notable patterns. First, cost-sharing parameters vary in generosity for the different categories of services. Cost-sharing parameters for primary care are the most generous while cost-sharing parameters for inpatient care are the least generous. Second, there is substantial savings available to consumers from plans with higher premiums if 13 A higher level of geographic aggregation for hospital prices is consistent with consumers often visiting hospitals outside of their county. Even though I replicate their methodology, my hospital price variable is generally higher in most rating areas as compared with the hospital price variable used by Dafny, Gruber, and Ody (2015) . My estimates for the relationship of hospital price and premiums of silver plans are very similar to theirs, however. This holds true not only when I run my regressions, but also when I mimic theirs. 14 If consumers use uncovered, out-of-network services, their cost could be much higher than the out-ofpocket maximum.
they are able to anticipate their medical utilization. 15 For example, in 2014 it would have been possible for someone with a $5,600 visit to the hospital to save almost $1,000 had they enrolled in the silver plan with the lowest-possible premium plus cost-sharing for that service rather than the silver plan with the lowest premium. Third, cost-sharing parameters changed from 2014 to 2015 differentially by category of service. For example, inpatient cost-sharing parameters decreased while emergency room cost-sharing parameters increased.
V. Empirical Strategy
The goal of this paper is to estimate the marginal effect of an additional insurer on premium plus cost-sharing parameters available to consumers from silver plans in their county. The challenge of this exercise is that demand and insurer variable costs can influence both entry and pricing. In this section I develop an identification strategy involving instrumental variables. I then examine the identification assumptions and discuss how the estimates should be interpreted.
A. R E G R E S S I O N M O D E L S
I use three separate instrumental variables regression models. I start with a model that relies on cross-sectional variation to estimate the effect of an additional insurer on premium plus cost-sharing parameters in the first year of the marketplaces. I then introduce two additional and separate models that rely on panel variation to estimate the effect of an additional new insurer on premium plus cost-sharing parameters in the second year of the marketplaces.
a.1. 2014 marketplaces.
If y m is one of the patient cost variables (e.g., the lowest-possible premium plus cost-sharing for a visit to the emergency room with service cost of $650) for county m, an example ordinary least squares (OLS) regression equation to relate insurer entry and premium plus cost-sharing parameters would be the following:
Observations are the 2,478 counties in the 31 states with federally facilitated marketplaces that also have more than one rating area. X m is a vector containing characteristics of county m, N m is the number of insurers participating in county m, and ε m contains all other county-specific variables that affect insurer pricing. The variables in X m are the same as those in Online Appendix Table A1 plus a constant. Since premiums for an identical plan cannot vary across multiple counties within a rating area, ϵ m is clustered by rating area.
The problem with using OLS to estimate equation 1 is that any components of demand or insurer variable costs contained in ϵ m can affect both insurer pricing and entry, which would bias the estimate of β. The direction of the bias is theoretically ambiguous. Unobserved insurer variable costs would influence pricing and entry in opposite directions while unobserved demand would influence premiums and entry in the same direction. Variation in insurer fixed costs would be an ideal instrument for insurer entry because fixed costs influence profits, and thus entry, but not pricing.
We can decompose fixed costs for insurers into two components, a local component and a state component. Examples of local fixed costs include marketing and establishing a network of medical providers. The state fixed costs are costs associated with regulatory compliance, which are likely to be substantial for insurers in their first year of participating in the marketplaces. They include navigating the plan approval process, providing brochures defining plan benefits, and eventually submitting enrollee risk scores. 16 The state fixed costs imply that insurers are more likely to enter a marginal county if they expect high profits in other counties in that state. This leads to plausibly exogenous variation across states that can be used to instrument for insurer entry. For example, suppose that two counties are identical in every way except that county A is in Arizona and county B is in Wyoming. If the counties in Arizona besides county A are more lucrative to an insurer than the counties in Wyoming besides county B, the insurer is more likely to enter county A than county B.
I use three instruments for the number of insurers in a county: (1) the number of residual rating areas, (2) the average market size of the residual rating areas, and (3) the total market size of the residual rating areas. 17 The residual markets are defined as rating areas rather than counties because residual counties in the same rating area are likely to influence demand or insurer variable costs. All else equal, more and larger residual rating areas increase the likelihood that insurers already pay the state fixed cost in a residual rating area and thus incrementally lower their total fixed cost. The total residual market size, the product of the other two instruments, controls for negative cross-derivatives. Additional residual rating areas are likely to be most important when their average market size is small. Similarly, increased average market size for residual ratings is likely to be most important when there are only a few of them. My preferred specification for estimating the effect of an additional insurer on premium plus cost-sharing parameters in the 2014 marketplaces extends equation 1 by using the vector of three instruments Z m for the number of insurers:
a.2. 2015 marketplaces. Adding data from the second year of the marketplaces allows me to estimate the effect of new insurer entry on changes to premium plus costsharing parameters. The advantage of this variation is that all time-invariant components of demand and insurer variable costs can be differenced out. The following equation represents an example first-differences OLS specification:
Similar to equations 1 and 2, observations are counties indexed by m. The numeric subscripts denote either the first year of the marketplaces or the second. Any variable associated with county m besides the number of insurers that changes from 2014 to 2015 is captured in ε m . Sheingold, Nguyen, and Chappel (2015) use a similar OLS specification in their analysis of premium changes from the first to the second year of the marketplaces. The problem with using OLS, however, is that β will be biased if new insurer entry occurred in counties where demand or insurer variable costs changed from 2014 to 2015. I address this potential endogeneity by separately using two sets of instruments for changes in insurer entry from 2014 to 2015.
The first set of instruments is the residual rating area instruments used for the crosssectional 2014 analysis. Since most of the new entry in 2015 was due to Assurant and United joining the marketplaces for the first time, the variation in state fixed costs associated with regulatory compliance are still applicable. The instrumental variables regression equation extends equation 3 with the same vector Z m of instruments used in equation 2:
The second set of instruments measures pre-ACA market shares for Assurant and United. The idea is that pre-ACA market shares measure variation in local fixed costs, as opposed to state fixed costs, for Assurant and United. Each insurer is likely to have lower local fixed costs in markets where they had a larger presence before the ACA because of preexisting relationships with providers and reputation with consumers.
There are three pre-ACA market share instruments. The first two are the 2012 shares in the individual market for Assurant and United. The available data, which I take from the Medical Loss Ratio files, dictates that the shares be measured at the state level.
19 Because Assurant and United are competitors, however, I also include the product of their 2012 market shares as a third instrument. All else equal, one insurer is most likely to enter a county where it previously had a large presence and the other insurer previously had a small presence. Accounting for competition between Assurant and United is important in order to capture variation in the number of new entrants. 
B. A D D R E S S I N G T H R E AT S T O I D E N T I F I C AT I O N
Online Appendix Table A3 presents the mean value for each instrument in each state.
Since the instruments measure cross-state variation, any unobserved state-level heterogeneity that is correlated with the instruments would compromise identification.
b.1. 2014 marketplaces. The identification assumption in equation 2 is that the instruments Z m are orthogonal to any unobserved components of demand and insurer variable costs. One reason to worry about the orthogonality assumption is that consumers may frequently visit medical providers outside of their own rating area. In particular, the estimate of β will be biased if hospitals in larger rating areas tend to charge different service costs than hospitals in smaller rating areas. When aggregated to the rating area level, however, the market size and hospital price variables have a very weak correlation coefficient of r = −0.03. Of course, there may be other mechanisms by which more and larger residual rating areas could be correlated with demand or insurer variable costs. In section VI.B, I perform a falsification test to show that the residual rating area instruments are uncorrelated with premiums, claims, and utilization in the pre-ACA individual insurance market. We might also worry about state-specific regulations that took effect in 2014. While an advantage of examining only the federally facilitated marketplaces is the general uniformity of the marketplaces across states, there are a few institutional differences across states that existed in 2014 but not in 2013. For example, Kowalski (2014) reports the states that expanded Medicaid and the states that allowed individuals to keep coverage from previously purchased non-ACA-compliant "non-grandfathered" plans. In section VI.B, I demonstrate the robustness of my estimates to controlling for which states expanded Medicaid and which states allowed non-grandfathered plans.
b.2. 2015 marketplaces. Though equation 4 uses the same set of instruments as
equation 2, the identification assumption is different. In equation 4, the instruments Z m must be orthogonal to any changes to demand or insurer variable costs between 2014 and 2015. For the version of equation 4 that uses the pre-ACA share instruments in place of the residual rating area instruments, the identification assumption is similar.
Any component of demand or insurer variable cost that has been changing over time would be a threat to identification. For example, we might be concerned about the recent trend of provider consolidation. In section VI.B, I perform a falsification test and find reassuring evidence that variables in both sets of instruments are uncorrelated with changes in premiums, claims, and utilization in the pre-ACA individual insurance market in the years leading up to 2014. Of course, this does not rule out the correlation of the instruments with any sharp changes to demand or insurer variable costs during 2014. As long as this case, indicators for the maximum number of pre-ACA lives, covered by Assurant or United, exceeding thresholds of 500 and 10,000 are sufficiently predictive instruments in the first stage. the results are similar whether the residual rating areas or pre-ACA share instruments are used, however, these sharp changes would have to correlate with both sets of instruments in order to make the estimates of β unreliable.
C. A D D R E S S I N G L I M I TAT I O N S T O I N T E R P R E TAT I O N
There are a few important caveats to interpreting estimates from the regression models presented in this section. First, the number of insurers is not necessarily a reflection of market competitiveness. A market with many insurers is not competitive if one insurer serves most of the market. This matters for my estimates because a small insurer may induce a different effect than a large insurer. In my cross-sectional analysis of the first year of the marketplaces, the estimates of β reflect the effect of entry by the average marginal insurer. In my analysis of the second year of the marketplaces, since the variation primarily comes from the new entry of Assurant and United, the estimates of β should be interpreted as the effect of new entry by a national insurer.
Second, my estimates reflect the effect of an additional insurer on offered premiums and cost-sharing parameters. They cannot be interpreted as an effect of insurer entry on premiums and cost-sharing parameters in purchased plans without strong assumptions about how patients choose among offered plans. The two ways I measure the offered premium plus cost-sharing parameters represent two extreme plan selection rules. The lowest-possible premium plus cost-sharing is the relevant measure for patients who perfectly anticipate their medical utilization and choose the plan with lowest combined premium and cost-sharing. The lowest-premium plan's premium plus cost-sharing is the relevant measure for patients who choose the plan with the lowest premium. Since planlevel enrollment data have not been made available for the marketplaces, it is not possible to empirically evaluate the validity of either plan selection rule. Recent studies that examine either employer-sponsored health insurance or Medicare demonstrate that plan selection rules are difficult to model. Abaluck and Gruber (2011) find that consumers value premium dollars more than expected cost-sharing dollars. Bhargava, Loewenstein, and Sydnor (2015) find that the majority of consumers choose financially dominated plans when given the option to build their own cost-sharing parameters. Many other researchers (e.g., Ericson 2014; Handel 2013; Miller 2014; Polyakova 2016) find that consumers do a poor job of reoptimizing their health plan selection every year. Given this literature, it is possible that only a small number of consumers follow one of the two plan selection rules my outcome variables represent.
Third, interpreting my estimates as an effect of insurer entry on offered unconditional patient costs, rather than offered premium plus cost-sharing parameters, requires that service costs are unaffected by insurer entry. This is likely not a good assumption, because a broad literature (e.g., Ho and Lee 2016; Melnick, Shen, and Wu 2011; Moriya, Vogt, and Gaynor 2010) shows that increased insurer competition increases service costs. For patients who owe coinsurance for marginal medical spending, higher service cost implies a higher unconditional patient cost that my estimates do not capture. Thus, my estimates likely overstate the effect of insurer entry to decrease offered unconditional patient costs and understate the effect of insurer entry to increase offered unconditional patient costs.
VI. Results
In this section I discuss my estimates for the marginal effect of insurer entry on premium plus cost-sharing parameters. I also perform falsification and robustness checks. Finally, I include a supplementary analysis to examine the importance of insurer entry influencing insurer bargaining power over medical providers.
A. M A I N E S T I M AT E S
I start by examining the effect of insurer entry on the benchmark premium, the secondlowest silver premium, in order to compare my results with previous work. I then examine the effect of insurer entry on premium plus cost-sharing parameters. All estimates are computed separately for the first and second years of the marketplaces. a.1. effect of insurer entry on benchmark premiums. Table 1 reports OLS, first-stage, reduced-form, and IV estimates related to the effect of an additional insurer on benchmark premiums in the 2014 (top panel) and 2015 (bottom two panels) marketplaces. The coefficients for the county characteristic variables are omitted from the top panel, but Online Appendix Table A4 provides the full set of estimates. Estimates in the bottom panel come from first-differences regressions, which difference out the county characteristic variables. The OLS estimates in the first column of Table 1 are similar for both years and match analogous estimates from Burke, Misra, and Sheingold (2014) and Sheingold, Nguyen, and Chappel (2015) . All else equal, an additional insurer in a county was associated with roughly a 3 percent lower benchmark premium.
The first-stage estimates for the residual rating area instruments are similar for both years and consistent with the motivation presented in section V.A. All else equal, more and larger residual rating areas were associated with more insurer participation. For a county with the median number of residual rating areas (seven), a one million increase (corresponding to 1.1 standard deviations) in the average market size of the residual rating areas was associated with 1.064 [1.498 − (7 × 0.062)] additional insurers in 2014. In 2015, the same increase in average market size was associated with 0.184 new insurers. More residual rating areas in the state were associated with more insurers, but the coefficient is only statistically distinguishable from zero for the 2015 marketplaces. For a county with the median market size of residual rating areas (0.16 million), an additional residual rating area was associated with 0.03 new insurers. The total market size in the residual rating areas of a state, the product of the other two instruments, has a negative and statistically significant coefficient for both years. The overall F-statistic for relevance of the residual rating area instruments is 88 in the 2014 marketplaces and 30 in the 2015 marketplaces.
The first-stage estimates for the pre-ACA share instruments are also consistent with the motivation presented in section V.A. Larger pre-ACA shares for Assurant and United were associated with more new entry, particularly where only one insurer had a strong pre-ACA presence. In a state where United had no presence in the 2012 individual market, a 10 percentage point increase (about 2.7 standard deviations) in Assurant's 2012 share was associated with 0.3 additional new insurers entering in 2015. In a state with the median United share of the 2012 individual market (0.082), however, the same 10 percentage point 
TA B L E 1 . Continued
Notes: Observations are counties in the 31 states with federally facilitated marketplaces that also have more than one rating area. The top panel includes data from the first year of the marketplaces only. The middle and bottom panels include data from the first and second years of the marketplaces in a first-differences framework. The residual rating area instruments are (1) the number of residual rating areas in the state, (2) the average market size of the state's residual rating areas, and (3) the total market size of the state's residual rating areas. Market size is the projected number of individuals eligible for federal subsidies, measured in millions. The pre-ACA share instruments are (1) Table 1 are the IV estimates in the fourth column. In the first year of the marketplaces, an additional insurer induced benchmark premiums to be 5 percent lower on average. The estimate is remarkably similar to the conclusion of Dafny, Gruber, and Ody (2015) , who use a different identification strategy to address the potential endogeneity of insurer competition. Since United did not participate in any counties in 2014, they use local variation in United's pre-ACA market share as a source of crosssectional variation in the predicted effect of United's exit. They estimate that the participation of an additional insurer in all 2014 marketplaces would have lowered benchmark premiums by 5 percent. While the IV estimate in the first column serves as an identification check based on previous estimates, the IV estimates in the bottom two panels of Table 1 are a new addition to the literature. On average, a new insurer in the second year of the marketplaces had no statistically distinguishable effect on benchmark premiums. a.2. effect of insurer entry on premium + cost-sharing parameters: 2014 marketplaces. Table 2 presents OLS and IV estimates for the effect of an additional insurer in the first year of the marketplaces on premium plus cost-sharing parameters. In columns 1 and 2, the outcome variables measure the lowestpossible premium plus cost-sharing for various service costs. In columns 3 and 4, the outcome variables measure premium plus cost-sharing for various service costs in the plan with the lowest premium. Coefficients for the county characteristic variables are not reported. The estimates generally indicate that an additional insurer decreased premium TA B L E 2 . Effect of insurer entry on (log) premium + cost-sharing in the 2014 marketplaces plus cost-sharing parameters by 5 percent or more. The only exception is that an additional insurer had no effect on the parameters' tail, where the patient uses enough medical services so that the out-of-pocket maximum is binding. The largest reductions in premium plus cost-sharing parameters due to an additional insurer, which ranged from 10 to 15 percent, were for inpatient services. Not only did competition in the first year of the marketplaces lower premiums, it also lowered inpatient cost-sharing parameters.
a.3. effect of insurer entry on premium + cost-sharing parameters: 2015 marketplaces. Table 3 presents OLS and IV estimates for the effect of a new insurer in the 2015 marketplaces on lowest-possible premium plus costsharing parameters. The estimates come from first-differences regressions and there are no unreported coefficients. The OLS estimates are in the left panel, the residual rating area IV estimates are in the middle panel, and the pre-ACA share IV estimates are in the right panel. The IV estimates with either set of instruments are similar. A new insurer had no statistically distinguishable effect on the lowest-possible premium plus cost-sharing parameters except for inpatient services and services with sufficiently large service costs. For a patient using inpatient services, a new insurer reduced premium plus cost-sharing parameters by 10 to 20 percent on average, with larger reductions for more expensive inpatient stays. A new insurer reduced premium plus out-of-pocket maximum by 5 or 6 percent on average. Table 4 reports analogous estimates using outcome variables that measure premium plus cost-sharing parameters from the silver plan with the lowest premium. The estimates are noisier but similar to the ones in Table 3 . A notable difference is that the pre-ACA share instruments indicate that a new insurer increased premium plus cost-sharing parameters for expensive primary care, specialist, and emergency room visits.
The implication of the estimates in Table 3 and Table 4 is that new insurers in 2015 did not lower premiums, but did lower inpatient cost-sharing parameters. 21 This might be because average insurer participation was substantially greater in 2015 versus 2014. I investigate this explanation further in Table 5 . In particular, I run first-difference regressions separately for two subsamples of counties: (1) counties with two or fewer insurers in the first year of the marketplaces and (2) counties with three or more insurers in the first year of the marketplaces. All 36 IV estimates are lower for the set of counties with fewer insurers in 2014. The same is true for 17 of the 18 OLS estimates reported in Online Appendix Table A5 . The most striking estimates in Table 5 are those for premium plus cost-sharing parameters associated with emergency room visits. In counties with three or more insurers in 2014, a new insurer increased premium plus emergency room cost-sharing parameters TA B L E 3 . Effect of insurer entry on (log) lowest-possible premium + cost-sharing in the 2015 marketplaces by 4 to 8 percent on average. 22 The increase is statistically distinguishable from zero with at least a 10 percent threshold for all eight estimates that incorporate four service cost scenarios and two sets of instruments. The estimates using the residual rating area instruments and the outcome variables for emergency room visits with service costs of $650, $1,400, and $2,900 are statistically distinguishable from zero at a 1 percent threshold. In section VI.C, I explore lost insurer bargaining power over emergency departments as a potential mechanism for the emergency room cost-sharing parameters to increase in the counties where new insurers entered.
B. FA L S I F I C AT I O N A N D R O B U S T N E S S T E S T S
Causal interpretation of the estimates in the previous subsection relies on the exogeneity of the instruments. If the instruments are truly exogenous to unobserved components of demand and insurer variable costs (equation 2) and changes in demand and insurer variable costs (equation 4), they should be uncorrelated with insurer pricing outcomes prior to the ACA. In order to assess the validity of the instruments, I thus test for their correlation with pre-ACA premiums, claims, and utilization. Since most of the variation in the instruments occurs across states, these falsification tests are all run at the state level. The pre-ACA data are for the individual insurance market and come from SNL Financial.
The falsification tests of the residual rating area instruments in the analysis of the 2014 marketplaces are presented in Online Appendix Table A6 . The first column uses the weighted (by market size) benchmark premium as the outcome to confirm that the instruments are predictive of 2014 insurer pricing. The estimates are similar to the reduced-form estimates at the county level presented in column 3 of Table 1 . The remaining columns in Table A6 demonstrate no evidence that any of the instruments are correlated with pre-ACA premiums, claims, or utilization. The measures of utilization are number of days spent in the hospital, number of inpatient admissions, number of physician ambulatory encounters, and number of nonphysician ambulatory encounters.
Online Appendix Table A7 contains estimates from falsification tests of the residual rating area instruments (top panel) and pre-ACA share instruments (bottom panel) in the analysis of the 2015 marketplaces. The first two columns confirm that the instruments are correlated with changes in premium plus cost-sharing parameters between the first and second year of the marketplaces. The remaining columns show little evidence that any of the instruments are correlated with annual changes in pre-ACA premiums or claims. Two of the 18 estimates are statistically significant at a 10 percent threshold, which is consistent 22 It is important to note that emergency room care has likely become more expensive in recent years because of increased entry of for-profit stand-alone emergency departments and increased out-of-network physician charges for emergency room care. Because of lack of data I am unable to control for these secular trends in my analysis. To explain the results, it would have to be the case that increases in emergency room service costs between 2014 and 2015 were correlated with both the residual rating area instruments and the pre-ACA share instruments. In Online Appendix Table A11 I show that the estimates are robust to excluding the two states (Texas and Ohio) in my data that have, according to Schuur et al. (2016) Tables A8 and A9 . One aspect of cross-state variation that is potentially problematic for my 2014 analysis is that states made different decisions on expanding Medicaid and allowing consumers to keep non-grandfathered plans. However, I find that variation in these regulations does not drive my estimates. In particular, Online Appendix Table A10 shows that the 2014 estimates are robust to including indicators for states that expanded Medicaid or allowed non-grandfathered plans.
C. A S S E S S I N G T H E I M P O R TA N C E O F I N S U R E R B A R G A I N I N G P O W E R
Perhaps the most surprising finding of the analysis is that entry of new insurers in the second year of the marketplaces increased emergency room cost-sharing parameters. This could be because insurers adjusted cost-sharing parameters to account for lost bargaining power in negotiating emergency room service costs. It might make sense that this effect would be particularly apparent for emergency room parameters, since geographic areas typically have fewer emergency departments than doctor's offices, specialty practices, or hospitals. As a rough test of the bargaining mechanism, I allow the effect of new insurers to increase emergency room cost-sharing parameters to vary according to the number of emergency departments in the county. In particular, I interact the variable for number of new insurers with a variable from the Area Health Resources File measuring the number of hospitals with emergency departments in 2012, the most recent year with these data. Since there are a handful of outlier counties with many emergency departments, I focus on counties with three or fewer emergency departments.
Since insurer bargaining power increases with insurer concentration but decreases with provider concentration, more insurer entry should lead insurers to increase emergency room cost-sharing parameters the most in areas with the fewest emergency departments. The estimates in Table 6 are consistent with this pattern. All 12 estimates of the interaction variable are (weakly) negative, and the residual rating area IV estimates for the two most expensive service costs are statistically distinguishable from zero using a 5 percent threshold. These results should be viewed as suggestive, rather than definitive, in favor of the bargaining mechanism. An important limitation of this analysis is the lack of data on emergency department diffusion since 2012, particularly for for-profit stand-alone emergency departments. To the extent that the recent spread of for-profit stand-alone emergency departments is correlated with new insurer entry in 2015 and the number of hospitals with emergency departments in 2012, the estimates may be biased. 
VII. Conclusion
In this paper I estimated the marginal effect of insurer entry on premium plus cost-sharing parameters separately for the first and second years of the ACA's health insurance marketplaces. In 2014, an additional insurer lowered premiums and inpatient cost-sharing parameters. In the second year of the marketplaces, however, new insurers lowered inpatient cost-sharing parameters but did not lower premiums or cost-sharing parameters for primary care, specialists, or the emergency room. A likely explanation for the different results is the substantial increase in the average number of insurers from 2014 to 2015. Consistent with this explanation, I find that a new insurer in 2015 was more likely to lower premium plus cost-sharing parameters if it was joining a county with two or fewer incumbent insurers versus a county with three or more incumbent insurers. From a policy perspective, it would be useful to know the optimal number of insurers to provide marketplace plans in each county. The optimal number is likely to be a function of provider concentration, which has been changing in recent years. Additionally, without the assumptions indicated in section V.C, my estimates are not necessarily informative about how insurer entry influences actual patient and taxpayer costs. Once more marketplace data regarding patients' plan choices and medical utilization become available, it will be important for future research to revisit this issue. While it is difficult to predict how insurer participation may continue to evolve in the marketplaces, it is not difficult to imagine a rationale for regulators to exercise control over the insurers serving different counties. States already exercise this control in their Medicaid managed care markets. Additionally, California, which fully manages its own marketplace, set a precedent for direct regulation of insurer participation in the marketplaces by not allowing United to serve many of its counties in 2015.
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